Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2

Article 9

1-1-1932

Recent Decisions
William M. Cain
Thaddeus J. Morawski
George W. Vander Vennet
Philip Konop

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William M. Cain, Thaddeus J. Morawski, George W. Vander Vennet & Philip Konop, Recent Decisions, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 254
(1932).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol7/iss2/9

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

he were to shoot and kill some one he would not be guilty of murder
because being incapable of a criminal intent, he is not criminally
responsible. The same principle is ordinarily applicable where insanity
is set-up as a defense. If an insane person does an act which would
be a crime if committed by a sane person, but because of insanity he
is unable to distinguish between right and wrong he has, in the eyes
of the law, no criminal intent, hence is not criminally responsible and
is not guilty of the alleged crime.

RECENT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL

Lnn

LAW-JURISDICTION

OF COURTS-LEoISLATURE

Powmass

To

OR CONTROL EQUITY JuPasmcTioN-The recent case of Burnham v. Ben-

nison, 236 N. W. 745 (Neb. 1931), holds that, since the Nebraska Constitution
expressly confers equity jurisdiction upon its district courts, it is beyond the
power of the legislature to limit or control that jurisdiction. The suit was brought
in the district court by the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust against the
trustees to establish their identity as beneficiaries and their right to a trust fund
of $10,000, while the estate was still in process of administration in the probate
court. The lower court sustained a demurrer to their petition, and the beneficiaries appealed to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, where the judgment of the
lower court was reversed. It seems to have been contended by the defendant
trustees in the lower court that, since the legislature had committed to the probate court jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the administration of estates
of deceased persons, the district court was deprived of jurisdiction until after
administration was complete. The Supreme Court rejected this contention entirely for the reason that the Nebraska Constitution having clothed the district
courts with "both chancery and common law jurisdiction, and such other jurisdiction as the legislature may provide," the legislature had no power either to
limit or control such equity jurisdiction.
The question arose in a peculiar way. George W. Mattingly died testate on
April 17, 1924, a resident of Butler county, Nebraska; his will was admitted to
probate on August 7, 1924, and remained in full force. The residuary clause of
the will provided in part: "The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real
and personal, wheresoever situated, I give, devise and bequeath to C. W. Bennison and I. T. McCaskey, as trustees, upon the following trusts: (a) that my
said trustees shall pay to Joseph Mattingly, a son of a half-brother of my father,
the sum of $10,000 on condition that in the event that the said Mattingly is
living at my death and appears and makes due proof of his identity to my said
trustees within one year after my death; and if the said Joseph Mattingly is
dead or fails to ippear then and in that event such payment shall be made to
his children, if any he has, on condition and in the event that his child or
children appear and make due proof to the said trustees of their relationship
within two years after my death; and if the said Joseph Mattingly fails to aPpear and make such proof within one year and if also his child or children fail
to so appear and make proof of their relationship within two years after my
death, then the provisions of this paragraph made shall lapse and be null aUd
void .... (c) My said trustees shall, during the term of said trust, cumulate the
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net income of said estate until the two year period after my death has elapsed
and my said trustees are then directed to assign, transfer and set over to C. W.
Bennison and I. T. McCaskey, of David City, Nebraska, in equal shares, the
rest, residue and remainder of the property remaining in the hands of said
trustees to vest in said C. W. Bennison and I. T. McCaskey the absolute title
thereto; my intention being to give, devise and bequeath to said C. W. Bennison and I. T. McCaskey all of such residue absolutely and unconditionally."
(Italics supplied.)
It was alleged in the plaintiffs petition thai the Joseph Mattingly referred to
in this will, died on March 19, 1919, leaving surviving him as his sole and
only children the plaintiffs in the suit; that within the two year .period after the
death of the testator, the plaintiffs appeared before the trustees and tendered
competent evidence and proof of the death of their father, Joseph Mattingly,
and of their relationship .to him, identifying their father as the Joseph Mattingly
named in the will, but that the trustees wholly failed to accept, receive or hear
said evidence, and failed to determine the facts established thereby; and that on
the last. day of the two-year perio'd, the plaintiffs filed their petition in the district court. Before proceeding to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction while the estate was still pending administration in the probate court,
the Supreme Court made this observation: "When the evidence and proof were
tendered within the two-year period, it was the plain duty of the trustees to
hear the same and proceed as contemplated by the testator. It is also quite apparent that, as the trustees named, under the terms of the will, should as individuals succeed to the bequegt provided for Joseph" Mattingly or his children
in the event the latter failed to comply with the expressed condition within two
years, their personal interests as individuals are inevitably in conflict with, and
antagonistic to, their duties as trustees. In a sense, in view of the situation,
these trustees are of necessity required to sit in judgment on their own case."
Then, passing to the question of the jurisdiction of the district court, the
Supreme Court said: "It may be said that, by the terms of -the Constitution,
district courts in Nebraska are vested with 'chancery and common law jurisdiction.' CONsT. ART. 5 § 9. This we have construed as vesting district coprts
with equity jurisdiction which they may exercise without legislative enactment.
Matteson v. Creighton- University, 105 Neb. 219, 179 N. W. 1009. Indeed, this
cqurt is committed to the view that, not only is equity jurisdiction conferred
by the terms of the Constitution, but as thus conferred it is beyond the power
of the legislature to limit or control. That, while the legislature may grant such
other jurisdiction as it may deem proper, it cannot limit or take from such
courts their broad and general jurisdiction which the Constitution has conferred
upon them. Lacey v. Zeigler, 98 Neb. 380, 152 N. W. .792. One of the well
recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction thus conferred on, and available in,
courts of this state, by virtue of this constitutional provision, is the supervision
of the administration of trusts. Matteson v. Creighton University, 105 Neb.
219, 179'N. W. 1009; Gotchall v. Gotchall, 98 Neb. 730, 154 N. W. 243."
The Supreme Court then points out that, for a period of more than six and
a half years, the trustees have not accorded the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the
trust, the opportunity to appear and make proof of their relationship, and holds
that thp lower court erred in susta'ining the demurrer ore tenus to the petition,
directing that the demurrer be overruled with leave to the parties to file amended
and supplemental pleadings, "to the end that all matters in issue may be determined and justice administered without unnecessary delay."
William M. Cain.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
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NEGLIGENCE--ImPUTED CONTRiBUTORY NEGLIGENCE Or PARENTS OR GUARDIANS

or INFANTs.-The parents of M brought suit against the defendants for damages
suffered because of the death of their seven year old son. It appeared that the
defendants, Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., supplied electricity to a substation
owned and operated by the other defendants, Shreveport Railways Co., located
in Shreveport, Louisiana. The land, on which the substation was situated, was
only partly occupied by the latter and the remainder, which was vacant, was
often used as a playground by the children of the neighborhood. The plaintiff's
house and lot are adjacent to the defendant's property. The rear of the plaintiff's lot, on which a garage is located, is immediately adjoining that part of the
defendant's property, on which the substation is situated, so that the garage
and the five-foot wire mesh fence that incloses the substation are separated by
only a few inches. There was some doubt as to whether M climbed the fence
or jumped into the inclosure from his father's garage. A meter reader, employee
of the Shreveport Gas & Electric Co., who found M" fatally burned in the inclosure, testified that he told the mother of M that the latter was in the inclosure, she however not recollecting the incident at the time of the trial. The
court, in discussing the liability of the Shreveport Railway Co., said that the
doctrine of imputed negligence, on part of guardians of a child of tender years,
to prevent recovery for injuries to child, does not prevail in Louisiana. McDonald
et ux. v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. et al., 136 So. 169 (La. 1931).
In the principal case the negligence of the parents was said to consist in
omitting to protect the child from negligence of a third person. In questions
arising similarly as in this case the courts have not all been harmonious as to the
application of the doctrine of imputed negligence.
In 1839 the Supreme Court of New York, in Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend.
(N. Y.) 615, 34 Am. Dec. 273, 12 Am. Neg. Cas. 293, announced the doctrine
of vicarious or imputable negligence, and the rule has been followed by the
courts of New York and some other states. The doctrine is founded upon the
assumption, that, since the child is non suf juris, the parent is the keeper of,
and agent for, the child, and ihe maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se is applied.
The child, in the case of Hartfield v. Roper, was two years old. He was injured
while sitting on a country highway by the sleigh and team of horses of the
defendant. The court held that there was no negligence on the part of the
plaintiff because of his tender age, but recovery was defeated by imputing to the
child the negligence of the parents,-negligence in omitting to protect the child
from the negligent acts of third persons. The doctrine, as laid down in Hartfield v. Roper, constitutes the minority rule and is followed by the courts of
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, and Massachusetts. Kyne v. Wilmington & N. R. Co.,
8 Houst. 185, 14 Atl. 922 (1888); O'Brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 522 (1878);
Baltimore City Pass R. Co. v. McDonell, 43 Md. 534 (1875) ; Lynch v. Smith, 104
Mass. 52, 6 Am. Rep. 188 (1870); however, the later cases seem to modify, somewhat, the rule of Hartfield v. Roper. In McGarry v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104, 20 Am.
Rep. 510 (1875), the court said: "It is in cases where the child has done or omitted
something which would be regarded in an adult as negligent, that the conduct
of the parents, in respect to the degree of care exercised over the child, becomes
material, and the reason is that negligence cannot be imputed to the child
except through the parents; but when the child has done no negligent act the
conduct of the parent may be regarded as too remote." Accord: Serano v. New
York Cent. Co. & H. R. R. Co., 188 N. Y. 156, 80 N. E. 1024 (1907); Sullivan
v. Chadwick, 236 Mass. 130, 127 N. E. 632 (1920). "But parents are holden
only to the exercise of reasonable care. And what is reasonable care depends
upon the facts and circumstances, and sometimes in part, even upon the financial
condition of the family. No exact rule can be laid down." Morgan v. Aroostook

RECENT DECISIONS

257

Valley R. Co., 115 Me. 171, 98 Atl. 628 (1916). As to the question of when, a
child is sui juris or not, "The standard of age at which a child is- chargeable
with parental negligence cannot be absolutely fixed, although within certain
limits it may be approximately determined." Grant v, Bangor Ry. & Electric
Co., 109 Me. 133, 83 Atl. 121 (1912). Where the age of the. child admits of no
doubt as to its capacity to avoid danger, the court will decide this as a matter
of law. McGarry v. Loomis, supra. On the other hand when there is some
doubt as to whether the child is sui juris then it is a question to be submitted
to the jury. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Sears, 11 Ind. App. 654, 38 N. E.
837 (1894) ; Central R. Banking Co. v. Ryler, 87 Ga. 491, 13 S. E. 584, 13 L. R. A.
634 (1891); Stone v. Drydock E. B. & B. Ry. Co. 115 N. Y. 104, 21 N. E. 712
(1889); Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Simpson, 60 Tex. 103 (1883).
In most jurisdictions the negligence of the parents or custodians in omitting
to protect the child against the negligence of a third person is not imputed to
the child so as to bar recovery by him from such third person. Those courts,
disaffirming the doctrine of imputed negligence, attack the reasoning of the
courts, upholding it, in the manner as followed in the language of the court
in South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Herklotz, 104 Ky. 400, 47 S. W. 265,
(1898), which said: "Of course it is essential to the recovery in any case that
negligence on the part of the defendant be shown. But when that is proven in
a suit by the child, the parent's negligence is no defence, because it is regarded
not. as proximate, but as a remote cause of injury. And the reason lies in the
irreponsibility of the child, who, itself, being incapable of negligence, cannot
authorize it in another. It is not correct to say that the parent is the agent
of the child, for the latter cannot appoint an agent. The. law confides the
care and custody of a child non sud juris to the parent; but, if this duty be
not performed, the fault is the parent's and not the child's. There is no principle then, in our opinion, upon which the fault of the parent can be imputed
to the child. To do so is to deny the child the protection of the law . . .. Now
this new doctrine of imputed negligence whereby the minor loses his suit, not
only where he is negligent himself, but where his father, grandmother, or mother's
maid is negligent, is as flatly in conflict with the established system of common
law as anything possible to be suggested. The law never took a child's property
because his father was poor, oir shiftless, or a scoundrel, or because anybody who
could be made to respond to a suit for damages was a negligent custodian to it.
But by the new doctrine, after a child has suffered damages, which confessedly
are as much his own as an estate conferred upon him by gift, and which he is
entitled to obtain out of any one of several defendants who may have contributed to them, he cannot have them if his father, grandmother, or mother's
maid happens to be the one making the contribution." Accord: Clover Creamery Co. v. Diehl, 63 So. 196 (Ala. 1913); Denver City Tramway Co. v. Brown,
57 Col. 484, 143 Pac. 364 (1914); Bronson v.. The Town of Southbury, Conn.,
37 Conn. 199 (1870); WilHams v. Jones, 106 S. E. 616 (Ga. 1921); Heldmair v.
Taman, 188 Ill. App. 283, 58 N. E. 960 (1900); Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v.
Bordenchecker, 33 Ind. App. 138; 70 N. E. 995 (1903); Fink v. Des Moines,
115 Iowa 641, 89 N. W. 28 (1902); Danna v. Monroe 129 La. 138, 55 So. 741
(1911) i, Westbrook' v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 66 Miss. 560, 14 Am. St. Rep. 587,
6 So. 321 (1889); Neff v. Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, 18 L. R. A. ( N. S.) 320, 127
Am. St. Rep. 606, 111 S. W. 1139 (1908); Flaherty v. Butte Electric.Co., 40
Mont. 454, 135 Am. St. Rep. 630, 107 Pac. 416 (1910); Huff v. Ames, 16 Neb.
139, 49 Am. Rep. 716, 19 N. W. 623 (1884); Berry v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co.,
70 Fed. 679 (1895); Markey v. Consolidated Traction Co., 65 N. J. L. 82, 46 At.
573 (1900); Bottoms v. Railroad "Co., 114 N. C. 699, 19 S, E. 730 (1894).
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Heretofore allthe cases that have been referred to are those wherein the
negligence of the parent or custodian, as to whether it constituted a defence or
not, to an action by a child, was the negligence in omitting to protect the
child against the negligence of third persons, or, in other words, permitting the
child to go astray without the proper care or attention when the child was
incapable of rendering it, itself. Now, then, comes up a closely correlated
question,-the question as to the right of a child to recover, where, at the time
of the injury, the child was in the immediate custody of the parent or custodian
and the parent or custodian were guilty of contributory negligence. As in the
former case so now in this instance most of the courts refuse to follow the
doctrine of imputed negligence. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Crosby, 53 Fla.
400, 43 So. 318 (1907); Brennan v. Minnesota.D. & W. Ry. Co., 130 Minn. 314,
L. R. A. 1915 F, 11, 153 N. W. 611 (1915); St. Clair St. Ry Co,. v. Eadie,
43 Ohio St. 91, 1 N. E. 519 (1885); Winters v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 99
Mo. 509, 12 S. W. 652, 17 Am. St.. Rep. 591, 6 L. R. A. 536 (1889); St. Louis
I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rexroad, 59 Ark. 180, 2§ S. W. 1037 (1894); Ohio &
M. Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 78 Ill.
88 (1875); Chicago City Ry. Co. v.'Wilcox, 138
Ill.
370, 27 N. E. 899 (1891). There are cases which bar recovery by the child
in the case where the child was in the immediate custody of the parent and the
latter was guilty of contributory negligence but they proceed on a different
principle. Thus where a father took passage, with his son, aged about ten
years, upon a train of cars, being assured that the train would stop at a certain
station, and when the whistle was sounded for such station, he and his son
went out of the coach upon the platform, and stepped down on the steps, and,
being burdened with luggage, stepped off the train before it stopped and the son
was thrown upon the station platform, and from there fell under the wheels
of the cars, where he received such an injury as to cause the loss of both legs,
it was held, that no recovery could be had against the company. The court
said: "Conceding it to be a correct principle, the negligence of the parent. or
guardian, having in charge a child of tender years, would not excuse the carrier
from using all the means in its power to prevent the injury, still if the negligence
of the former was the proximate cause of injury to the child, by unnecessarily
and imprudently exposing it to danger, the carrier upon no just principle can
be held responsible." Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 78 Ii. 88 (1875).
Accord: Stillson v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., 67 Mo. 671 (1878).
On the other hand the courts of the minority view are more prone to apply
the rule of imputed negligence in the case where the child was injured while
in the custody of a parent or a.guardian and the parent or guardian were guilty
of contributory negligence. Gallagher v. Johnson, 130 N. E. 174 (Mass. 1921);
Holly v.Boston Gaslight Co., 8 Gray 123, 69 Am. Dec. 233 (1857); Blossom Oil
& Cotton Co. v. Poteet, 136 S. W. 432, 35 L. R. A. (N..S.) 449 (Tex. 1911);
Levine v. Metropolitan Str. Ry. Co., 177 N. Y. 523. 69 N. E. 1125 (1903);
Lifschitz v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co., 73 N. Y. S. 888, 67 App. Div. 602
(1902); Wallace v. John A. Casey Co., 116 N. Y. S. 394, 132 App. Div. 35 (1909).
An interesting case is Hennesey v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 6 App. Div. 206, 39
N. Y. S. 805, (1896), wherein it appeared that the plaintiff, an infant twentyone months old, was riding with her father and mother in a phaeton, the father
driving, and the mother holding the plaintiff in her lap. The father negligently
drove on to the crossing of the defendant railroad and the infant was injured.
It was held that the negligence of the father was not imputable to the infant,
and that her mother being free from contributory negligence, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover. Mr. Justice Cullen, in writing the opinion of the court,
said: "In this case the child, while in the law subject to the paramount guardianship of the father, was in the immediate custody of the mother. Its extreme
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youth rendered it necessary that someone must have not merely legal control,
but also actual personal possession of .the child. Here that person was the
mother, who held the child in her arms. It should for the purposes of this
action, be deemed as in her immediate custody, not as in the custody of both
parents, or of the father alone. The attention or care at the time was to be
bestowed on it, from its helpless condition because it was an infant and not an
adult, was to proceed from the mother. The care that the father, was to exercise,
he was to exercise whether the plaintiff was non sui juris or an adult, whether it
was his child or a stranger's. The mother's negligence was therefore, properly to
be attributed to the child, but not that of the father." That case had not, however, been considered by the Court of Appeals of New York. A case exactly
in point, in all practical respects, but which disapproves the decision and the
reasoning, is Delaware L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Devore, 52 C. C. A. 77, 114 Fed. 155
(1902).
"The parent's care ought to be a shield to protect but the want of it ought
not to be used as a sword to impair or destroy, the right of an infant to recover
for injuries inflicted by a wrongdoer." Berry v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 70 Fed.
679 (1895).
Thaddeus J. Morawski.

PARENT AND CrO-AcrioN BETWEx
PARNT AND C
Dw-The plaintiff, an
unemancipated girl of sixteen, residing with her father, the defendant, was injured in an automobile accident while a passenger in her father's car. She sued
him for damages due to the negligent operation of the car. The lower court
overruled the defendant's demurrer to the declaration and certified to the Supreme
Court of Appeals the question of the sufficiency of the declaration, especially on
the question as to whether an unemancipated infant is entitled to maintain an
action against her father for an injury edue to negligence. The Appellate Court
gave a negative answer, stating that the basis of the rule that an unemancipated
infant is not entitled to maintain a tort action against his parent, "Lies in the
very vital interest which society has in preserving harmony in domestic relations,
and in not permitting families to be torn asunder by suits for damages by petulant,
insolent, or ungrateful children against their parents for real or fancied grievances.
It is deemed better that an occasional wrong should go unrequited than that
family life should be subjected to the disrupting, effects of such suits." Securo v.
Securo, 156 S. E. 750 (W. Va. 1931).
At Common law it was well established that a minor, unemancipated child
was not entitled to maintain a tort action against his parents. CooLEY ON ToRTs,
3d ed., 492 (1906).
This rule has been held to be analogous to that'where either spouse is' forbidden to sue the other for torts committed during coverture. Abbott v. Abbott,
67 Me. 304, 31 A. L. R. 1139 (1877). In that case a man and woman married
and during coverture the wife became insane. The husband, with the aid of
three other men who were also named defendants in the action, forcefully placed
her in an insane asylum. The court in its decision stated the rule to be: "A wife
cannot maintain an action against her husband for a tort committed during
coverture."1
But where statutes have removed the fiction of legal identity of husband and
wife, it is held that she is entitled to sue him for an assault committed on her
person during coverture. Gilman v. Gilman, 195 Atl. 657 (N. H. 1915). Such
actions would be as disruptive of the family peace as actions between parent and
child. So if the family peace argument does not hold as to actions between
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husband and wife, it may 'be strongly contended that it should not hold in
actions by a child brought against his parents.
The law never has denied a child the right to maintain an action against his
parents, or any person in loci parentis, for breaches of a legal duty owing to
the child. Small v. Morrison, 118 S. E. 12 (N. C. 1923). The English courts
have held that a child's property rights would be upheld as against his parents
or persons in loci parentis. Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 489 (1737). While relief was usually obtained in equity, it was not because the infant was personally
incapacitated to sue elsewhere.
As to the right to maintain a suit against his parents for a personal injury,
the great weight of American authority is against the right. The reason, as
given by the courts for its disallowance, is that to allow its existence would be
disruptive. of the family peace.
Where the parental relation has been abandoned, either expressly or impliedly,
the disability to sue incident to the family relation, no longer exists. Thus, where
a parent, in his relation with his unemancipated child, treats the child as though
the parental relation has been abandoned, the child may maintain an action for
injury caused by the parent. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 Atl. 905 (N. H. 1930).
"The father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daughter ought not
to be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace of the family as an answer
to an action seeking compensation for the wrong. The relation is rightly fortified
by certain rules. Outside that relation, the. rules are inapplicable; and any attempt to apply them leads to irrational and unjust results." Dunlap v. Dunlap,
supra. A decision supporting this statement has not been specifically made, but,
in Matarese v. Matarese, 131 Atl. 198, 42 A. L. R. 1360 (R. I. 1925), it is suggested that there may be liability for malicious acts whereby the substance of the
family relation has been destroyed.
..Parental abandonment should be implied in the case of malicious injuries.
Such'acts are in no way referable to the parental status, and they indicate its
abandonment more clearly than words. ' The argument that, while the parent's
wrong is justly considered an abandonment of his right to immunity, yet the
public interest, in behalf of which the immunity is asserted, still persists and demands the continuance of the immunity, should not be heard for the reason that
the ideal sought to be maintained has been destroyed by the action of the parent..
Either parent has the right to inflict reasonable and moderate chastisement on
the child for the punishment of faults or disobedience and the enforcement of
parental authority. In case this right is abused and punishment, brutal and unreasonable, is given the child, the parent is amenable to the criminal law, but
the child has no civil remedy against the parent for personal injuries inflicted,
so long as the relation of parent and child continues. People v. Green, 119 N. W.
1087 (Mich. 1909).
The authority of the parent to chastise the child may be delegated but the
liability of the parent attaches in case of unreasonable and brutal punishment.
Rowe v. Rugg, 91 N. W. 903 (Iowa 1902).
In conclusion we may then say: Such immunity as the parent may have
from suit by the minor child for personal tort arises from a disability to sue,
and not from lack of violated duty. This disability is not absolute. It is imposed for the protection of family control and harmony, and exists only where
a suit or the prospect of a suit might disturb the family relations. Stated from
the viewpoint of the parent, it is a privilege, but only a qualified one. It is
not an answer to a suit for an intentional injury, maliciously inflicted. It does
not apply to an emancipated child, or to a case where liability in fact has been
transferred to a third person.
George W. Vander Vennet.
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MAs
AND SERv~Ac--Auomozms--T-eri.-The case of Schweinhaut,
Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Wardman Park Taxicab Company, v. Flaherty, 49
Fed. (2d) 533 (1931), is interesting in many respects. The case was begun in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and from there was appealed
to the Court of Appeals of the District. of Columbia. In the latter court it
was held that the owner of a taxicab company was liable for one of their
driver's negligence while the driver was transporting a friend free and in
violation of the company's rules. The facts of this case can be stated quite
briefly. The Wardman Park Taxicab Company maintained two exclusive stands
or concessions for their cabs in the front of two large hotel buildings in the
city of Washington. When their cabs were not carrying passengers the drivers
were expected to be at one or the other of these stands. No regular place was
fixed for the drivers to procure their meals but they were told by company
officials to use as little mileage as possible and not to go out of their way for
this purpose. One of the drivers for this company, pursuant to a previous
arrangement, met a female friend while at one of the stands and invited her
to go with him for his supper after which he drove her home free 'of charge,
going several blocks out of his way to do so. While driving the woman to her
home, the taxicab struck a pedestrian who brought this action against the
owner of the taxicab company.
The taxicab company asserted non-liability for the driver's negligence. The"
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and a judgment was accordingly entered
from which the defendant appealed. The judgment of the lower court was
affirmed, the appellate court holding that, under the circumstances stated, the
owner of the taxicab was liable for the driver's negligence, because, an automobile in the crowded traffic conditions existing in the large cities is potentially
a dangerous instrumentality, the use of which results in fatalities approaching
those of modern warfare. The court added: 'In these circumstances it seems
to us the duty of the court to indulge no subtle reasoning in extending the
doctrine of non-liability to the owner of such an instrumentality who, in his
search of gain and profit places one of these in irresponsible hands, but rather
to require of him such supervision of his servant as will avoid disobedience
to and disregard of his rules, or, failing so to do, when injury occurs to a
stranger, to shoulder the responsibility.".
Associate Justice Groner, who wrote the opinion, does not stand alone in
his reasoning. However, while he pictures a strong case against the taxicab
company he does so in violation of a doctrine of agency called that of respondeat
superior. Corpus Juris sets forth the doctrine in the following terms: "A master
is liable for injury to persons or property resulting from the acts of his servants,
done within the scope of his employment and in the master's services." 39 C. J.
1279. The master is not liable for every tort the servant might commit. "Beyond the scope of his employment the servant is as much a stranger to the
master as any third person; and an act of the servant not done in the execution
of the services for which he was engaged cannot be regarded as an act of the
master, and no liability attaches to him by reason of such act under the doctrine
of resPondeat superior." 39 C. J. 1280. Certainly this doctrine should have
been given some consideration. However, the fact that the cab company used
automobiles which are dangerous instrumentalities, they are not only responsible
for the making of rules that will make them safe upon the public highways
but they are also responsible for the hiring of competent drivers and the reasonable means of enforcing these rules upon their drivers. If competent drivers
are not hired, and if reasonable means are not employed by the company to
see that their rules of safety are enforced upon their drivers then I would
say the cab company was liable and that the opinion here stated was just.

